Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis

P. Cotogno
2003 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science  
A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be defined by Turing Machines ('Thesis P'); in this formulation the Thesis appears an empirical, more than a logico-mathematical, proposition. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability ('hypercomputation'): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. These models depend on infinite computation, explicitly or implicitly, and appear
more » ... lly implausible; moreover, even if infinite computation were realizable, the Halting Problem would not be affected. Therefore, Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis.
doi:10.1093/bjps/54.2.181 fatcat:xlui5wr4bfhqfeplrj2e4gdawy