Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness

Michele Budinich, Lance Fortnow
2011 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11  
We consider a repeated Matching Pennies game in which players have limited access to randomness. Playing the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this n-stage game requires n random bits. Can there be Nash equilibria (or ε-Nash equilibria) that use less than n random coins? Our main results are as follows • We give a full characterization of approximate equilibria, showing that, for any γ ∈ [0, 1], the game has a γ-Nash equilibrium if and only if both players have (1 − γ)n random coins. • When players
more » ... re bound to run in polynomial time, ε-Nash equilibria can exist if and only if one-way functions exist. *
doi:10.1145/1993574.1993592 dblp:conf/sigecom/BudinichF11 fatcat:rwdz3hmycnf47luxucfb3lonzi