When outcomes of developmental projects undertaken are uncertain, ruling parties in a democracy often face a difficult choice. Taking up projects that fail result in bad publicity and hence a dent in the vote bank. But on the other hand a successful project leads to more votes as well as more money in the funds for the ruling party. In the context of a two party model of democracy with neutrals and supporters, we set up a dynamic stochastic model to explore this situation. Using numerical

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... s, we show that the rate of failure of projects play a crucial role in changing the probability of a reelection. We also explore the role of other factors like rate of project arrival, party loyalty and changeover probability. The results indicate that in a strategic setting, in some situations, the ruling party would be better off by ensuring a low rate of project arrival to increase their chances of reelection. This has interesting implications for addressing the development vs. political stability conundrum.