What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jean-Francois Laslier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon
2017 PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE  
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial
more » ... s used in real high-stake elections) exhibits excellent performance, whereas the Bloc rule (also often used in practice) performs poorly.
doi:10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612 fatcat:gdqcuo7pqvbkpeawbdkz7fj4pi