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What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain
2017
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE TWENTY-EIGHTH INNOVATIVE APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
We visualize aggregate outputs of popular multiwinner voting rules — SNTV, STV, Bloc, k-Borda, Monroe, Chamberlin–Courant, and PAV — for elections generated according to the two-dimensional Euclidean model. We consider three applications of multiwinner voting, namely, parliamentary elections, portfolio/movie selection, and shortlisting, and use our results to understand which of our rules seem to be best suited for each application. In particular, we show that STV (one of the few nontrivial
doi:10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10612
fatcat:gdqcuo7pqvbkpeawbdkz7fj4pi