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The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
2004
Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '04
We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria.
doi:10.1145/1007352.1007445
dblp:conf/stoc/FabrikantPT04
fatcat:iolkx27lf5ebplvjx7igubyuau