A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Federico Echenique, Jorge Oviedo
2004 Social Science Research Network  
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under wich the setwisestable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory
more » ... e standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.691443 fatcat:slc5r7ljhfckrbvchhkxqbsyjq