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Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
2016
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation - EC '16
We study the problem of optimal auction design in a valuation model, explicitly motivated by online ad auctions, in which there is two-way informational asymmetry, in the sense that private information is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of each bidder for the item depends both on his own and the item's type. Importantly, we allow arbitrary auction formats involving, potentially, several rounds of signaling from the seller and decisions by
doi:10.1145/2940716.2940789
dblp:conf/sigecom/DaskalakisPT16
fatcat:4lcwdfqtfna57fekjqreltkwfi