Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske's Approach

José María Díaz Nafría, Mario Pérez-Montoro
2011 tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique  
Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske's approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske's approach
more » ... andcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.
doi:10.31269/triplec.v9i2.285 fatcat:oppevhhu4vcsxjfbdx4zsuc5ra