Relationalism about Perception vs. Relationalism about Perceptuals

Andrew Stephenson
2016 Kantian Review  
AbstractThere is a tension at the heart of Lucy Allais's new account of Kant's transcendental idealism. The problem arises from her use of two incompatible theories in contemporary philosophy – relationalism about perception, or naïve realism, and relationalism about colour, or more generally relationalism about any such perceptual property. The problem is that the former requires a more robust form of realism about the properties of the objects of perception than can be accommodated in the
more » ... mmodated in the partially idealistic framework of the latter. On Allais's interpretation, Kant's notorious attempt to balance realism and idealism remains unstable.
doi:10.1017/s136941541600008x fatcat:vnuhasujk5apto3cakht2bmjjm