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政治的貨幣循環による日本銀行の独立性の検証 : 日本の選挙と金融政策の分析
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This article aims to measure the independence of the Bank of Japan using political monetary cycles. Based on previous studies, there are two ways to measure central bank independence:(1)by focusing on the formal laws for central banks, and(2)by focusing on the autonomous behavior of central banks for political actors. However, in the formal approach, laws do not always have the expected effect on independence. On the other hand,
doi:10.34382/00013151
fatcat:bifppdp7srb6xjwx3y7asvptsm