A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence-Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation
[article]
2019
arXiv
pre-print
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions between the players and quantitatively characterizes the conflicting incentives and strategic responses. In this chapter, we provide an overview of deception games in three different environments and extend the baseline signaling game models to include
arXiv:1902.03925v1
fatcat:setsnhv7ajfxvn6jadqedvfevy