Vote-Independence: A Powerful Privacy Notion for Voting Protocols [chapter]

Jannik Dreier, Pascal Lafourcade, Yassine Lakhnech
2012 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Recently an attack on ballot privacy in Helios has been discovered [20] , which is essentially based on copying other voter's votes. To capture this and similar attacks, we extend the classical threat model and introduce a new security notion for voting protocols: Vote-Independence. We give a formal definition and analyze its relationship to established privacy properties such as Vote-Privacy, Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Resistance. In particular we show that even Coercion-Resistant protocols do not necessarily ensure Vote-Independence.
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-27901-0_13 fatcat:rsygosflxne6vmukml4us5pamq