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Evolutionary Game Analysis between Local Government and Enterprises on Bridge Employment from the Perspective of Dynamic Incentive and Punishment
2022
Systems
The popularization of bridge employment is conducive to the realization of active aging, which requires not only the subjective initiative of retirees but also the active cooperation of local governments and relevant enterprises. This study combined evolutionary game theory with system dynamics to model and simulate the behavior of local government and enterprises on bridge employment, aiming to highlight the importance of government behavior and enterprise actions in the process of active
doi:10.3390/systems10040115
fatcat:xwxcic43orc7bnf6zstq2bvg2q