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A Model for Delimited Information Release
[chapter]
2004
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). Noninterference fails
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-37621-7_9
fatcat:sr33oc572ncu3f4zsjewml6cim