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Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems
2022
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
We study the design of a class of incentive mechanisms that can effectively prevent cheating in a strategic classification and regression problem. A conventional strategic classification or regression problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, or a principal-agent problem between the designer of a classifier (the principal) and individuals subject to the classifier's decisions (the agents), potentially from different demographic groups. The former benefits from the accuracy of its decisions,
doi:10.1145/3490486.3538300
fatcat:77f7pjcvdzhplohj4ksj7vpnzu