Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight

Dan D. Crawford
2002 Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR)  
When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a
more » ... del for justification, I show how ordinary perceivers would appeal to external factors to support their perceptual beliefs, and normally suppose that their beliefs are reliably connected to the objects their beliefs are about. I find in this feature of our common justificatory practice a sufficient basis for positing an externalist condition on justification-namely that subjects are justified only if their beliefs are reliably connected to their objects.
doi:10.5840/jpr_2002_3 fatcat:alsyum327fdq5ge2cviaotnzay