A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit <a rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.03609v1.pdf">the original URL</a>. The file type is <code>application/pdf</code>.
<span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
Embedded devices are becoming more widespread, interconnected, and web-enabled than ever. However, recent studies showed that these devices are far from being secure. Moreover, many embedded systems rely on web interfaces for user interaction or administration. Unfortunately, web security is known to be difficult, and therefore the web interfaces of embedded systems represent a considerable attack surface. In this paper, we present the first fully automated framework that applies dynamic<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.03609v1">arXiv:1511.03609v1</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/t5uafot525du7efqxgcfqenvga">fatcat:t5uafot525du7efqxgcfqenvga</a> </span>
more »... e analysis techniques to achieve, in a scalable manner, automated vulnerability discovery within embedded firmware images. We apply our framework to study the security of embedded web interfaces running in Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) embedded devices, such as routers, DSL/cable modems, VoIP phones, IP/CCTV cameras. We introduce a methodology and implement a scalable framework for discovery of vulnerabilities in embedded web interfaces regardless of the vendor, device, or architecture. To achieve this goal, our framework performs full system emulation to achieve the execution of firmware images in a software-only environment, i.e., without involving any physical embedded devices. Then, we analyze the web interfaces within the firmware using both static and dynamic tools. We also present some interesting case-studies, and discuss the main challenges associated with the dynamic analysis of firmware images and their web interfaces and network services. The observations we make in this paper shed light on an important aspect of embedded devices which was not previously studied at a large scale. We validate our framework by testing it on 1925 firmware images from 54 different vendors. We discover important vulnerabilities in 185 firmware images, affecting nearly a quarter of vendors in our dataset. These experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach.
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