Dynamic Equilibrium of Market Making with Price Competition

Jialiang Luo, Harry Zheng
2020 Dynamic Games and Applications  
AbstractIn this paper, we discuss the dynamic equilibrium of market making with price competition and incomplete information. The arrival of market sell/buy orders follows a pure jump process with intensity depending on bid/ask spreads among market makers and having a looping countermonotonic structure. We solve the problem with the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game approach and characterize the equilibrium value function with a coupled system of Hamilton–Jacobi nonlinear ordinary
more » ... ntial equations. We prove, do not assume a priori, that the generalized Issac's condition is satisfied, which ensures the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. We also perform some numerical tests that show our model produces tighter bid/ask spreads than those derived using a benchmark model without price competition, which indicates the market liquidity would be enhanced in the presence of price competition of market makers.
doi:10.1007/s13235-020-00373-w fatcat:s75s6mgnqvh7nfqxrinay7ymkq