Stable Matching Games [article]

Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Rida Laraki
2021 arXiv   pre-print
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both improve their utility by forming a new pair. They proved, algorithmically, the existence of a stable matching. Shapley and Shubik, Demange and Gale, and many others extended the model by allowing monetary transfers. We offer a further extension by assuming
more » ... matched couples obtain their payoff endogenously as the outcome of a strategic game they have to play in a usual non-cooperative sense (without commitment) or in a semi-cooperative way (with commitment, as the outcome of a bilateral binding contract in which each player is responsible for his/her part of the contract). Depending on whether the players can commit or not, we define in each case a solution concept that combines Gale-Shapley pairwise stability with a (generalized) Nash equilibrium stability. In each case, we give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of stable allocations to be non-empty, we study its geometry (full/semi-lattice), and provide an algorithm that converges to its maximal element. Finally, we prove that our second model (with commitment) encompasses and refines most of the literature (matching with monetary transfers as well as matching with contracts).
arXiv:2008.01680v2 fatcat:rtps6kugibfw3dshrtnpg6yz6e