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Three approaches to coordinated bargaining: A case for power-based explanations
2014
European journal of industrial relations
This article reviews and discusses three different theoretical approaches to the study of coordinated collective bargaining which posit three different causal mechanisms for coordination. Rational choice posits power relations based on resource-dependence; rationalist institutionalism posits rules of the game; and discursive institutionalism stresses shared meaning structures. It is argued that each approach is based on different views of coordination involving exercise of power where some
doi:10.1177/0959680114527032
fatcat:fkwdf7d5mncgbf6iocazf4uv7q