Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium

Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman
2015 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation  
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In this model we establish that in order to compute a correlated equilibrium any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential (in n) number of times. After the completion of this result we became aware of a recent and independent work by Hart
more » ... endent work by Hart and Nisan [13] that generalizes the result presented in this paper. In particular, Hart and Nisan [13] establish query complexity lower bounds for randomized algorithms and computing approximate equilibria; for a discussion of this work see Section 4.2.
doi:10.1145/2785668 fatcat:shuuqymdyvhzlfqlmzxfgwu3jy