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Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies
2021
Review of Industrial Organization
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AbstractWe analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency's incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be
doi:10.1007/s11151-021-09813-2
fatcat:pw3v776eevgctfevin74yvaz4u