Puzzled by realism: a response to Deichsel

Uskali Mäki
2011 Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics  
No realist project in and about economics is close to completion. There are many open issues that remain to be addressed and resolved. Simon Deichsel (2011) has written a healthy challenge that should offer some useful inspiration to anyone interested in assessing and perhaps contributing to the realist projects. He argues against realism and in support of some sort of anti-realism. My response first deals with some conceptual issues regarding the very ideas of realism and anti-realism. I will
more » ... hen discuss the role of pragmatics in relation to truth. Finally, I will address the issue of justifying realism-Deichsel's title, after all, suggests his challenge is directed against what he calls the pragmatic justification of realism. My remarks are both brief and selective. REALISM, ANTI-REALISM, AND SUSPENDING JUDGEMENT ABOUT TRUTH Deichsel defends what he calls anti-realism against realism. It is important to see how he defines "anti-realism" and that he does it disjunctively (Deichsel 2011, 24). Accordingly, anti-realism is the thesis that we should: [1] "suspend judgement on the truth and truth-worthiness of our theories" or [2] "avoid talking about the truth of theories altogether" and we should do so [3] "in order to minimize the confusions that surround this concept" (that of truth).
doi:10.23941/ejpe.v4i1.69 fatcat:3dwuk3churb3rla3t75yt35d7y