Mechanism Design for the Joint Control of Pollution

F. Xue Zhang, J. Wang
2015 Proceedings of the 2015 International Symposium on Material, Energy and Environment Engineering   unpublished
From the perspective of the central government, this paper analyzed that the externality of pollution control would lead to market inefficiency, and studied the implementation in dominant strategy equilibrium and sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Study found: Market inefficiency came from private information and inadequate supervision of the mechanism designer, and the sufficient and necessary conditions of implementation in Nash equilibrium have been gotten, also a dynamic mechanism to
more » ... mechanism to realize the joint control of regional air pollution was built. At the same time, a mechanism with asymmetric information was posed to implement the goal function in dominant equilibrium. International Symposium on Material, Energy and Environment Engineering (ISM3E 2015)
doi:10.2991/ism3e-15.2015.90 fatcat:jy7r3qfkezaxdmuu5r2j6icdva