Envy, truth, and profit

Jason Hartline, Qiqi Yan
2011 Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce - EC '11  
We consider profit maximizing (incentive compatible) mechanism design in general environments that include, e.g., position auctions (for selling advertisements on Internet search engines) and single-minded combinatorial auctions. We analyze optimal envy-free pricings in these settings, and give economic justification for using the optimal revenue of envyfree pricings as a benchmark for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. Moreover, we show that envy-free pricing has a simple nice structure
more » ... and a strong connection to incentive compatible mechanism design, and we exploit this connection to design prior-free mechanisms with strong approximation guarantees.
doi:10.1145/1993574.1993612 dblp:conf/sigecom/HartlineY11 fatcat:lww4glog7rf5xdyqinp4vnpobi