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AEA Randomized Controlled Trials
This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in endowment and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005) : two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative actions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does notdoi:10.1257/rct.5399-1.0 fatcat:le7gcsb3wretzatfylaec6ia4e