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Coevolutionary games on networks
Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics
We study agents on a network playing an iterated Prisoner's dilemma against their neighbors. The resulting spatially extended co-evolutionary game exhibits stationary states which are Nash equilibria. After perturbation of these equilibria, avalanches of mutations reestablish a stationary state. Scale-free avalanche distributions are observed that are in accordance with calculations from the Nash equilibria and a confined branching process. The transition from subcritical to critical avalanchedoi:10.1103/physreve.66.056118 pmid:12513567 fatcat:t4tk4joovngqnpk7oys2teliyi