Sustainable Management in Regional Fisheries: Mechanisms of Motivation of Myopic Agents

Guennady Ougolnitsky, Anatoly Usov
2018 Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Development of the Regional Economy: Response to Global Challenges" (CSSDRE 2018)   unpublished
This paper is dedicated to the game theoretic investigation of a dynamical model of optimal fishing with consideration of the interests of regional control agents on two levels of hierarchy and building of an original incentive mechanism. The main distinctive property of the paper consists in the consideration of a "myopic" agent who maximizes his payoff only in the one time period (one fishing season). Besides, the impulsion instead of compulsion is used as a method of control. The problem is
more » ... olved by the simulation modeling, and for the investigation of the respective non-antagonistic differential two-players game a method of qualitatively representative scenarios is used. Its principal idea is that from a very big and even infinite set of the potentially existing control scenarios it is possible to choose a very small number of scenarios that reflect qualitatively different development paths of the controlled system. These scenarios are distinguished principally, while the others do not give anything essential new. The numerical verification of the formal requirements of the method using real data on the Azov Sea is made.
doi:10.2991/cssdre-18.2018.16 fatcat:kbfmetrzdjcble3ju6fha7xgja