Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid--seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non--commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal

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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE RECENT LEGAL LITERATURE for the acts of the representative, which is said to depend upon different considerations in the case of agency from those that determine the liability of a master for his servant's acts. It is doubtful if these seeming differences are real. All depends upon whether the representative was so acting in the course of the purpose for which he was employed that the constituent should be responsible. Agents and servants are employed for different purposes, but so are different agents, and often the same person is both agent and servant. Whatever name is given to the representative the question is still what was the course of his employment. The discussion, here and in some other recent text and legal journals, is almost purely academic, as there are few if any cases that recognize the distinction between duties that involve "manual or mechanical" service, and those that result in new legal relations with third persons. As a matter of fact the only cases in which the distinction between agent and servant has been of real importance have been those involving a statute using the word "servant." In such cases it is necessary to decide whether the statute applies to the particular representative. Again it is submitted that the extended analysis of "imputed notice" has obscured rather than clarified a simple though disputed matter. At first notice to the agent was imputed to the principal on the ground of their legal identification on matters within the scope of the agency. With the fading of that view the courts rested the doctrine on the duty of the agent to disclose. Such duty extends equally to all facts as to the subject matter of the agency known to the agent, no matter when learned. Unless there be in the circumstances something that makes it probable that the agent will not do his duty the law presumes he has done it, and imputes the knowledge to the principal. Starting from such a simple basis all the applications of the rule become comparatively simple. Such broad principles, explaining many apparent differences, and making easy a variety of applications, the author has often stated as a starting point, with happy results. The general statement as to scope of agencies, p. 203, res gestae, p. 255, admissions by agents, p. 247, and execution of negotiable instruments, p. 336, are a few of many illustrations of admirable statements of general fundamental propositions that greatly simplify the understanding of their varied applications. .On the whole the work is very creditable to its author, already of established repute because of his valuable services as a legal writer. To say that it is what was to have been expected from his pen is to give both the text and the writer deserved praise.