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Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey
2020
Experimental Economics
AbstractThe paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the market (schools) is not strategic, and rules (priorities) guide the acceptance decisions. The model covers applications such as school choice programs, centralized university admissions in many countries, and the centralized assignment of teachers to schools. In the college admissions model, both sides of the
doi:10.1007/s10683-020-09667-7
fatcat:vqnb7aqsnrc45lojwwakl6jxee