A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2007; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
The Castle on the Hill
2000
Review of economic dynamics (Print)
A simple example of a stochastic game with irreversibility is studied and it is shown that the folk theorem fails in a robust way. In this game of Castle on the Hill, for a broad range of discount factors, including those close to one, equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium for large discount factors is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium for low discount factors. A unique cyclic equilibrium is also possible for intermediate ranges of discount factors. * I would like to thank NSF
doi:10.1006/redy.2000.0094
fatcat:olfgpqpibjh2vew7mhil46ta7u