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Adopting the Cascade Model in Ad Auctions: Efficiency Bounds and Truthful Algorithmic Mechanisms
2017
The Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) are one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms, with a revenue of about $72 billion in the US alone in 2016. However, the problem of designing the best economic mechanism for sponsored search auctions is far from being solved, and, given the amount at stake, it is no surprise that it has received growing attention over the past few years. The most common auction mechanism for SSAs is the Generalized Second Price (GSP). However, the GSP
doi:10.1613/jair.5438
fatcat:s3eoniifznd7pmpfqjrqbyn7kq