To Save Or Not To Save: The Fisher Game [chapter]

Ruta Mehta, Nithum Thain, László A. Végh, Adrian Vetta
2014 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
We examine the Fisher market model when buyers, as well as sellers, have an intrinsic value for money. We show that when the buyers have oligopsonistic power they are highly incentivized to act strategically with their monetary reports, as their potential gains are unbounded. This is in contrast to the bounded gains that have been shown when agents strategically report utilities [5] . Our main focus is upon the consequences for social welfare when the buyers act strategically. To this end, we
more » ... fine the Price of Imperfect Competition (PoIC) as the worst case ratio of the welfare at a Nash equilibrium in the induced game compared to the welfare at a Walrasian equilibrium. We prove that the PoIC is at least 1
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_24 fatcat:lq7sqikcdbbkbmkxup4zz6dxyy