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A Pragmatic Account of the Weak Evidence Effect
Language is not only used for neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmaticdoi:10.1162/opmi_a_00061 pmid:36439072 pmcid:PMC9692057 fatcat:dei7qdwyp5dy3nhi7g3zuuwfda