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Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Performance: Some Empirical Results from SIDS
Procedia Economics and Finance
This paper empirically examines environmental regulation politics in terms of proactive lobbying at different levels of public environmental management, namely enacting legislation and implementing policies. In the proposed models, effectiveness of environmental regulation is captured by (i) level of stringency of environmental regulations, (ii) degree of enforcement, and (iii) the achievement of various environmental performance goals. Findings from cross-country regressions support thedoi:10.1016/s2212-5671(13)00063-4 fatcat:b47g7ky4tvbkdiz7xjmfbxjy3m