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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 68 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. they are all actions for an equitable execution. The creditor has a claim against the trustee, who in turn has a right of exoneration from any liability incurred by him without fault in manaaging the estate. This right is not merely one of reimbursement, but the trustee is entitled to apply the income of the trust estate to discharge the claim. There is therefore no reason why the creditor may not, by an equitable execution, apply this right of exoneration to the satisfaction of his own claim. True, no general creditor of the trustee can get at this right of exoneration, but that is owing to its peculiar nature; it is a right against the trust estate solely for the purpose of satisfying that particular claim. It does not appear in the principal case that the trustee was expressly authorized by the testator to carry on a business for the benefit of the trust estate; but though f?oi-rall v. Harford, 8 Vesey, 4, which limited the right of recovery to liabilities incurred in such a business, was cited, it is perhaps too much to infer that the court meant to dissent from that and similar decisions. In the United States this limitation has been generally disregarded, and properly, for it is purely arbitrary and at the same time ulljust. The principal case is, at all events, a long step towards a consistent doctrine. RECENT CASES. AGENCY -INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR -NEGLIGENCE. -Through the negligence of an independent contractor employed by the defendant to tear down a buildiing, part of a wall fell, damaging the plaintiff's building. Held, that the defendant is liable though he used due care in selectinlg a competent contractor. Covintgton Bridge Co. v. Steinbrook, 55 N. E. Rep. 6i8 (Ohio). See NOTES. AGENCY -UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL -ELECTION. -Held, that an unsatisfied judgment against an agent, obtained in ignorance of the existence of his undisclosed principal, is no bar to a subsequent action against the principal. Brown v. Reimnan, 62 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., Fourth Dept.). There is very little authority on the point in this country. Beymer v. Botsall, 79 Pa. St. 298, is probably in accord with the principal case, though the decision is not quite clear. The English courts, however, maintain the opposite view. Priestley v. Fernie, 3 H. & C. 977. While the present case is clearly correct in holdilng that the plaintiff could not make an election without knowing of his right against the principal, nevertheless recovery might well have been denied on the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action had become merged in the judgment against the agent. His right is really a single contractual claim on which by an anomaly he is allowed to proceed against either the agent or the principal; but as soon as this claim is turned into a judgment against one, it is gone, and there is no longer any basis for an action against the other. See Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504, 514. AGENCY -WRONGFUL SALE -INNOCENT PURCHASER. -The plaintiff consigned goods to a retail grocer to sell on commission in the ordinary course of his business. The consignee immediately sold the entire stock for cash to the defendant, who had no notice of the agency. Held, that the plaintiff can maintain replevin. Ronzeo v. Martueci, 45 Atl. Rep. I & 99 (Conn.). Apparently the precise poinit here involved has never before been decided, but, on principle, the case can hardly be supported. The court relies upon the well-settled law that a factor cannot pass the title of his principal by a pledge or barter. Kinder v. Sh/aw, 2 Mass. 397; Guneiro v. Peile, 3 B. & Ald. 6i6. These decisions are, however, based on the fact that such acts are rot naturally incident to a power of sale, ald hence no authority can be implied. But in the principal case there is no need for an implied authority, sinice the consignee has an express power to sell. The limitation of this authority to sales at retail should be no more effective against a purchaser ignorant RECENT CASES. 69 boarded a train for the purpose of speaking to a passenger, was inijured by the nlegligence of the railwvay. Held, that the company is not liable, sinice its emiployees had no notice of her presence. Bullock v. Houston, etc. Ry. Co., 55 S. W. Rel). 184 (Tex., Civ. App.). By the weight of authoritv, the carrier is under a duty, irrespective of notice, to use the same care toward persons for whom the passenger may demanid access to the train that he must use toward the passenger. Little Beock, etc. B. B. Co. v. Lawton, 55 Ark. 428; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Crunk, I19 Ind. 542. The principal case is a novel attempt to include mere social visitors among such persons. The right has not, however, been extended by the decision-s beyonid cases where the assistance of the third person is reasonably necessary to aid the passeniger to eniter or leave the car, sinlce the public duty of the carrier covers onily such matters as are incidental to the carriage. Doss v: Missouri, etc. Ry. Co.., 59 Mo. 27; Whitbey v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 987. Here, therefore, there should be no more than the ordiniary liability of a landowner, and, as there is, generally speakinig, no duty to anticipate trespasses, the decision is correct. Palmer v. Northern Pacific R. B. Co., 37 Minll. 223. CARRIERS -PUBLIC DUTY -EXCLUSIVE PRIV LEGES. -Held, that a common carrier may granit to a hackman the exclusive privilege of solicitinig patronage within its station. Godbout v. Saint Paul, etc. Co., 8I N. W. Rep. 835 (Minn.). See NOTES. 70 HAR VA RD LA W RE VIE W. CARRIERS -TICKETS -MISTAKE. -The defendant's ticket agent by mistake gave the plainitiff, instead of an unlimited ticket, one wlhich was void after a certain date. After that time the conductor refused the ticket, and ejected the plaintiff upon his failure to pay f-;re. Held, that the plaintiff may recover for being ejected. Walker v. Price, 59 l'ac. Rep. I 102 (Kan., C. A.). The doctrine of this case has some support. Kansas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Riley, 68 Miss. 675; Georgia Ry. Co. v. Dougherty, 86 Ga. 744. The great weight of authority is, however, that a ticket whenpresented on the train is governed by the terms on its face, regardless of the mistake of the selling agent. Bradshaw v. South Boston A. R. Co., 135 Mass. 407; Towznisenzd v. New York, etc. R R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295. This seems the sounder view, for the carrier in issuing the ticket merely undertakes to accept it according to its terms in discharge of the holder's common law obligation to pav fare. Therefore, when a ticket is presented which is on its face inivalid, the holder has no right to ride without pavinig on the train, and the company should be justified in ejecting him. The purchaser, of course, has his remedy either in tort for the negligent misrepresentation of the ticket agent, or in contract for breach of the implied warranty.