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Proceedings of the Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2022
Over the past decade, a few side-channel attacks (SCAs) and countermeasures against implementations of Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), commonly used in embedded systems and Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, have been presented. This work discovers a new side-channel power leakage of an ECDH hardware implementation protected against existing attacks, where the power leakage is not directly related to the key bits, but related to the differential of two consecutive key bits. We propose andoi:10.1145/3526241.3530342 fatcat:wbjmcjxhjvbtzn5qnvtjjdihli