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What would have happened? Counterfactuals, hypotheticals, and causal judgments
How do people make causal judgments? In this paper, I show that counterfactuals are necessary for explaining causal judgments about events, and that hypotheticals don't suffice. In two experiments, participants viewed video clips of dynamic interactions between billiard balls. In Experiment 1, participants either made hypothetical judgments about whether ball B would go through the gate if ball A weren't present in the scene, or counterfactual judgments about whether ball B would have gonedoi:10.31234/osf.io/rsb46 fatcat:nfhe6nvidzh45mencdkqpshzcu