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Exploiting Bank Conflict-based Side-channel Timing Leakage of GPUs
2019
ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO)
To prevent information leakage during program execution, modern software cryptographic implementations target constant-time function, where the number of instructions executed remains the same when program inputs change. However, the underlying microarchitecture behaves differently when processing different data inputs, impacting the execution time of the same instructions. These differences in execution time can covertly leak confidential information through a timing channel. Given the recent
doi:10.1145/3361870
fatcat:bev2fymd3vhidfeblke4isbsoe