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Entry Regulation and Persistence of Profits in Incumbent Firms
2020
Review of Industrial Organization
Preserved Fulltext
In line with the theory of creative destruction, industries where incumbent firms generate high profits will attract entry, which should drive down profits. This disciplinary effect of entry implies that profits above the norm should not exist in the long run. Factors that affect entry—such as entry regulations—could affect this profits convergence process. Using an unbalanced panel of firm- and country-level data for approximately 13,000 firms in 33 countries between 2005 and 2013, we examine
doi:10.1007/s11151-020-09787-7
fatcat:ze77lrdfnvdoneecn4nanafefm