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Optimizations of Side-Channel Attack on AES MixColumns Using Chosen Input
[article]
2019
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
Considering AES sub-steps that can be attacked with a small guess space, the most practicable is to target SubBytes of extremal rounds. For its contrast between candidates (non-linearity) and that the search space is reduced to 2 8 -sized blocks. But when such point of interests are not available, MixColumns may be considered but involve search spaces of 2 32 -sized blocks. This number of attacks to run being often considered as unrealistic to reach, published papers propose to attack using
dblp:journals/iacr/VasselleW19
fatcat:q7jmh2rji5csvhi2uel5afs7ke