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18. Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games
[chapter]
2020
Advances in the Sociology of Trust and Cooperation
Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions are able to sustain cooperation, but whether carrots or sticks are more successful in this respect is still under dispute (e.g., Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange 2011; Rand et al. 2009; Sefton, Schupp, and Walker 2007). Furthermore, while many studies investigated the effects of sanctioning institution on cooperation, the long-term effects of sanctions on group solidarity are largely unexplored. In this chapter, we discuss
doi:10.1515/9783110647495-018
fatcat:2bze2nepxzaand3vqrcj2nqgzu