Verification of DNSsec Delegation Signatures

Florian Kammuller
2014 2014 21st International Conference on Telecommunications (ICT)  
In this paper, we present a formal model for the verification of the DNSsec Protocol in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. Relying on the inductive approach to security protocol verification, this formal analysis provides a more expressive representation than the widely accepted model checking analysis. Our mechanized model allows to represent the protocol, all its possible traces and the attacker and his knowledge. The fine grained model allows to show origin authentication, and
more » ... y attack prevention. Most prominently, we succeed in expressing Delegation Signatures and proving their authenticity formally.
doi:10.1109/ict.2014.6845127 dblp:conf/ict/Kammuller14 fatcat:l6vauefhwngntnehwc6fh6uscm