Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy Against Computational Adversaries [chapter]

Angelo Troina, Alessandro Aldini, Roberto Gorrieri
2005 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  
Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the Dolev-Yao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then the two
more » ... adversary models turn out to be equivalent. As an application of our approach, we show how to determine a secrecy property against the computational adversary.
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31794-4_5 fatcat:osdun4qkqvfvxbminx2farmcwa