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Towards a Formal Treatment of Secrecy Against Computational Adversaries
[chapter]
2005
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical Dolev-Yao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the Dolev-Yao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then the two
doi:10.1007/978-3-540-31794-4_5
fatcat:osdun4qkqvfvxbminx2farmcwa