A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Behavioral dimensions of contests
[unknown]
Companion to the Political Economy of Rent Seeking
unpublished
The standard theoretical description of rent-seeking contests is that of rational individuals or groups engaging in socially inefficient behavior by exerting costly effort. Experimental studies find that the actual efforts of participants are significantly higher than predicted in the models based on rational behavior and that over-dissipation of rents (or overbidding or over-expenditure of resources) can occur. Although over-dissipation cannot be explained by the standard rationalbehavior
doi:10.4337/9781782544944.00017
fatcat:h6hcm5555bd47peahelffcl3u4