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On the Number of Bins in Equilibria for Signaling Games
2019
2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, we have shown that the number of bins under any equilibrium has to be at most countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford and Sobel who considered sources with density supported on [0, 1]. In this paper, we refine this result in the context of exponential and Gaussian
doi:10.1109/isit.2019.8849498
dblp:conf/isit/SariotakasFGLY19
fatcat:qvs7eembxjghziytyvoeapa2ti