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PUBLIC FINANCE RESEARCH PAPERS ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN EX ANTE CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS: PRECONTRACTUAL LIABILITY REGIME
2014
unpublished
During negotiations, parties plan an exchange that will occur in the future and that implies a high level of uncertainty, regarding both contract conditions and final outcome. In this phase, parties are requested, according to country--specific legal framework, to act in good faith. As a matter of fact, the definition of the boundaries of the good faith principle could be used as a strategic variable to understand when a form of pre--contractual liability is both necessary and efficient. Once
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