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My Traces Learn What You Did in the Dark: Recovering Secret Signals Without Key Guesses
[chapter]
2017
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
In side channel attack (SCA) studies, it is widely believed that unprotected implementations leak information about the intermediate states of the internal cryptographic process. However, directly recovering the intermediate states is not common practice in today's S-CA study. Instead, most SCAs exploit the leakages in a "guess-anddetermine" way, where they take a partial key guess, compute the corresponding intermediate states, then try to identify which one fits the observed leakages better.
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-52153-4_21
fatcat:3d3imujaerap7bzquw45lvdk34