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Deepening the (Parameterized) Complexity Analysis of Incremental Stable Matching Problems
[article]
2022
arXiv
pre-print
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may become unstable. Then, a natural goal is to find a matching which is stable with respect to the modified preferences and as close as possible to the initial one. For Stable Marriage/Roommates, this problem was formally defined as Incremental Stable
arXiv:2208.01563v2
fatcat:fxjc5ntrqvbubeallw4tm2jqqi