Based upon the paradigm of self-organization, the present paper investigates the concept of cognitive memory from a non-representationalist perspective. Basic principles of self-organization are presented to provide elements for an ecological approach to memory. This is contrasted with the traditional Cartesian notion of memory which is intrinsically connected to mental representation. Leaving aside the notion of mental representation, we propose an analysis of memory in terms of dispositional

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... tates. These can be understood as states whose causal properties, when encountering adequate conditions, produce specific events. In this sense, dispositional states constitute causal propensities and, as we shall argue, they constitute the fundamental elements of memory. KEY WORDS: self-organization, cognitive memory, dispositional states, cognitive science. 1. Self-organization and the mind/body problem One of the most important (and also most criticised) aspects of the Cartesian system of ideas is the well known substantial dualism. According to this, the mind body relationship is conceived as a metaphysical solution to the problem of foundation of true knowledge in so far as Descartes aimed to provide indubitable principles on which scientific knowledge could be based. He believed that in order to establish the foundations of true knowledge he should set aside all the information obtained from sensory experience of the world, since it cannot provide us with the required certainty that can stand beyond any possible metaphysical doubt. Only the abstract, rational, principles of reason can play such a role: the human body with its sensory experiences has no important role to play in such a project since it cannot not provide any secure source of knowledge. In such a context, the mind/body division, established in order to provide foundations of true knowledge, imposes, as real, the existence of two distinct substances the res cogitans and the res extensa. However, it should be noticed that this division follows from a previously conceived metaphysical decision. Substantial dualism thus established gives place to the mind/body debate. This stands as a problem reinforced by the relationship that one establishes with his/her own subjective experience, which forces the classification of all phenomena related to consciousness as belonging to a category essentially distinct from that under which physical phenomena can be classified.